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Abstract 
It is believed by many scholars that a small and me-
dium-sized enterprise (SME) cannot be seen through 
the lens of a large firm. Theories explaining IT gov-
ernance in large organizations and leading to meth-
odologies used by practitioners can therefore not be 
extrapolated to SMEs, since we are dealing with a 
completely different economic, cultural and manage-
rial environment. SMEs suffer from resource poverty, 
have less IS experience and need more external sup-
port. SMEs largely attribute to the failure of many IS 
projects.  We define an outsourced information sys-
tem failure (OISF) as a failure of governing IT in an 
SME environment and propose a structure for stating 
propositions derived from both agency theory and 
theory of trust. The theoretical question addressed in 
this paper is: how and why do OISFs occur in SMEs? 
We have chosen for a qualitative and positivistic IS 
case study research strategy based on multiple cases. 
Eight cases of IS projects were selected. We found 
that trust is more important than control issues like 
output-based contracts and structured controls for 
eliminating opportunistic behaviour in SMEs. We 
conclude that the world of SMEs is significantly dif-
ferent from that of large companies and extra care 
should be taken by researchers and practitioners de-
signing artefacts for SMEs.  
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IT GOVERNANCE IN SMES: TRUST OR 
CONTROL? 
 
1 Introduction 
It is believed by many scholars that a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
cannot be seen through the lens of a large firm. Therefore theories explaining IT 
governance in large organisations and leading to methodologies used by practitio-
ners cannot be extrapolated to SMEs, since we are dealing with a completely dif-
ferent economical, cultural and managerial environment (Welsh and White 1981). 
Despite the efforts to develop methods for governing IT in SMEs, like the Cobit 
QuickStart method the adoption rate is rather disappointing (IT Governance Insti-
tute 2003). IT governance in SMEs is still immature. Both scholars and practitio-
ners, grounded too much in their way of thinking-, hold  a too simple vision of an 
SME as a scale model of a large firm (Raymond 1985). We still lack genuine 
SME-centred theories that can lead to general inferences about how SMEs should 
govern IT. Riemenschneider et al. stated that: „[...]May be organizational theories 
and practices, such as bureaucratic structure and organizational behaviour, appli-
cable to large organizations may not be valid in small ones‟ (Riemenschneider 
2003).   
We focus in this work on the constructs of trust and control in relation with IS pro-
jects in SME environments.   This paper is based on an ongoing research on IT 
governance in SMEs and reports on some recent research based on a qualitative, 
positivistic and multiple case study research strategy where we investigate IS fail-
ures in an outsourced SME environment. Due to their small scale and hence a lack 
of in house IT-skills, SMEs depend more on IT vendors than large companies 
(Thong  2001, Thong et al. 1997). However this does not mean that outsourcing is 
without risks or problems. From a managerial point of view we associate risk in IT 
outsourcing with negative outcomes. One risk scenario that is of special interest 
for this research are the occurrences of IS failures. We elaborate on IS failures fur-
ther in this paper. IS failures can lead to disputes which can be separated in litiga-
tion and non-litigation since not all IS failures lead to litigation.  
Following this introduction the paper is structured into six further parts. The spe-
cific relation between SMEs and IT with focus on the phenomenon of outsourced 
IS failures is reviewed in the next part. We elaborate on the theoretical founda-
tions of trust and control in part three. Part four details the research methodology 
and the research design. Part five brings the results of testing the propositions by 
the multiple case study and our empirical observations together with a discussion 
of our findings. Finally in part six we draw our conclusions.  
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2 Outsourced IS Failures in SMEs 
Research and literature have highlighted the definitional problems of SMEs. 
Companies differ in size, location, ownership structure, financial performance, 
maturity and management style. It should be ideal to clearly define an SME  be-
fore going into any research. However this is not obvious. There are many charac-
teristics to identify an SME. The European Commission took an initiative to de-
fine a SME in terms of microeconomic characteristics like turnover (not exceeding 
50 million euro), annual balance sheet total (not exceeding 43 million euro) and 
headcount (fewer than 250 persons) (European Commission 2003). This definition 
is made from a legal and economic point of view and is not always accurate when 
it comes to the study of the relation between the company and IT, but this defini-
tion holds for our research.   
In the years of the dotcom hype many believed that IT would enable SMEs to 
compete with large companies. However a lack of readiness for networking with 
other enterprises and reluctance to use advanced IT proved otherwise (European 
Commission 2004). SMEs perceive little incentive to change business models 
when returns are unclear (OECD 2004). Research also showed that SMEs do not 
excel in knowledge retention and obtaining a sustainable competitive advantage. 
There is a slower adoption of IT in SMEs than in large enterprises (Lia et al. 2004, 
Premkumar 2003). Existing mechanisms of IT governance build on a strong belief 
that IT creates values for the business do not work as such in SMEs where deci-
sion making is mostly centred round one person (Levy et al. 2003, Southern et al. 
2000, Lefebvre et al. 1997). SMEs also cannot learn and benefit from past experi-
ences because there are not enough IS projects conducted.  
Existing research on IT and SMEs is fragmented in terms of findings and concep-
tual approaches (Harrison et al. 1997). In this research we focus on two major 
findings: the role of the CEO as the principal decision maker in SMEs (Southern 
et al. 2000; Lefebvre et al. 1997) and the dependency of SMEs on external IT ex-
pertise (Thong 2001, Thong et al. 1997).  Thong has shown that both findings are 
related: “The results show that the most effective IS implementation environment 
is one in which both top management support and external IS experts work as a 
team” (Thong et al. 1997).  
Despite the numerous success stories illustrating the advantages of bringing in-
formation technology into organisations, it is broadly accepted that the processes 
of designing, developing and implementing are cumbersome and not straightfor-
ward. Recent and older reports show that IS projects frequently fail. The broad 
and elaborate research on IS failures has been conducted for more than four de-
cennia (Ackoff 1967, Lucas 1975, Lyytinen et al. 1987, Sauer 1993, Keil 1995, 
Beynon-Davies 1999, Ewushi-Mensah 2003, Iacovou et al. 2005, Avison et al. 
2006). Practitioners and expert witnesses report frequently IS failures in SMEs as 
well as in large companies (Standish Group 2004, Webster 2000). 
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IS failures can be divided in expectation (Lyytinen et al. 1987) and termination 
(Sauer 1993) failures. Expectation failures can be categorised in correspondence, 
process and interaction failures. Correspondence failures occur when IS are evalu-
ated towards previous defined design objectives. A lack of correspondence be-
tween design objectives and evaluation is seen as a failure. Process failures occur 
when there is unsatisfactory development performance, i.e., one fails to produce a 
workable system or to deliver within the budget constraints of time and costs. 
Process failures are sometimes called „runaways‟ or escalating projects (Iacovou 
2004, Keil 1995). Interaction failures are situated within the mismatch between 
requirements and user acceptance. An interaction failure appears when an IS is not 
used. In summary, an IS expectation failure is the inability of an IS to meet the 
expectations of the stakeholders.  
Sauer brought up the more pragmatic concept of the termination failure (Sauer 
1993). According to Sauer an IS failure can only occur when the development 
process or operation of an IS causes dissatisfied stakeholders to abandon the pro-
ject. 
We argue that there is an extra dimension to IS failures that is not covered by 
those descriptive models, which we call the Outsourced IS Failure (OISF). An 
OISF is a failure that occurs during an IS project in an outsourced environment. 
We use the taxonomy of Lacity and Hirschheim (Dibbern et al. 2004) of outsourc-
ing options and focus on Project Management. Some academics have already 
pointed out that outsourcing increases risks leading to IS failures (Natovich 2003, 
Aubert et al. 2003).  
We see an OSIF in a SME as a failure of governing IT in a SME environment and 
propose a structure for stating propositions derived from both agency theory and 
the theory of trust in the following section. The theoretical question addressed in 
this paper is: how and why do OISFs occur in SMEs? An overview of the litera-
ture provides strong support for believing that a lot of OISFs do occur in SMEs 
and that the construct of trust is of significant importance. Mohtashami et al. 
stated that: „[...] the absence of a proper level of trust is primary reason for a larger 
percentage (40 to 70%) of collaboration failure‟ (Mohtashami et al. 2006).    
3 Theory: Trust and Control  
The concept of trust is subtle, diffuse and elusive. Although there is agreement on 
the importance of trust there also appears disagreement on a suitable definition of 
the construct (Bigley and Pearce 1998). Trust can be seen as a co-ordinating 
mechanism based on shared moral values and norm supporting collective co-
operation and collaboration within uncertain environments (Reed 2001). Blois 
gives a number of definitions of trust appearing in frequently quoted papers (Blois 
1999). Trust/control relations between organisations can be seen as highly com-
plex structures of social relations and processes which are needed for the genera-
tion and maintenance of collective action. The concept of trust is crucial in busi-
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ness interactions that are characterise by mutual dependency combined by with a 
lack of mutual control. Some researchers argue that trust is also reciprocal. Ac-
cording to Reed: „[...] the essential character of all trust relations is their reciprocal 
nature. Trust tends to evoke trust, distrust to evoke distrust.... As trust shrinks, dis-
trust takes over.‟ (Reed 2001).   
The concept of trust was already used in IS research (Mohtashami et al. 2006, Ge-
fen 2004, Lander et al. 2004, Sahberwal 1999) and in related environments as 
R&D (Blomqvist 2005) and business to business relationships (Blois 1999).   
A working definition of trust already used in IS research and most suitable for our 
empirical setting is given by Gefen: „Trust is the belief that others upon whom one 
depends, yet has little control over, will not take advantage of the situation by be-
having in an opportunistic manner but, rather, will fulfil their expected commit-
ments by behaving ethically, dependably and fairly especially under conditions 
involving risk and potential loss‟ (Gefen 2004).  
Trust can occur on the personal level or on the organisational level. The latter is 
also known as institutionalized trust. The concept of personal trust seems to be 
relevant in family-owned SMEs since in those organizations the central role of the 
CEO has been identified as a key factor for effective IS implementation (Thong et 
al. 1997). However, Zaheer et al founded that interpersonal and organizational 
trust are highly correlated (Zaheer et al. 1998). 
Sabherwal states that interorganizational relationships involve a psychological 
contract and a formal written contract. The written contract is negotiated and well 
understood, while the psychological contract consists of unwritten and largely un-
spoken sets of expectations held by the transacting parties about each other‟s pre-
rogatives and obligations (Sabherwal 1999). Governing IT in an outsourced envi-
ronment requires dealing with both types of contracts.  Trust supports the 
psychological contract. An outsourced IT project in an SME environment can be 
seen as an interpersonal cooperation and exchange. Trust limits the need for struc-
tured controls by reducing the perceived need to guard against opportunistic be-
haviour when unexpected changes occur in an IT project. Structural controls are 
appropriate mechanisms including deliverables, reporting arrangements, meeting 
schedules, penalty clauses for governing the project and to address compliance 
with the contract (Sabherwal 1999). Trust can also be seen as a mechanism for re-
ducing complexity. Trust do not goes into the complexity itself but tries to avoid 
or to reduce it. Theoretically, the role of trust in an outsourced IS environment, 
amongst others things, appears to be important. 
A predominant theory central to Western management thinking and one of the 
cornerstones for governance is the Agency Theory (Jensen et al. 1976, Eisenhardt 
1986). Agency theory has his roots in the research of decision making and was 
used as an explanation of the theory of firm. Its original setting was the principal 
as the firm‟s owner(s) and the agent as the manager(s). Agency theory and deriva-
tive theories like formal control theory  and IT governance are also a very popular 
theories used in IS research (Aubert et al. 2005, Weil et al. 2004, Choudhury and 
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Sabherwal 2003, Kirsch 2002, Kirsch 1997). Together with transaction cost econ-
omy theory, agency theory is seen as a foundation for IS outsourcing (Dibbern et 
al. 2004). However its contribution is not always very clear since the excessive 
truth-claims and assumptions of the agency theory are entirely based on analyses 
in environments other then IT/IS.  
Agency theory views problems that occur in outsourced environments as the re-
sults of three factors: goal differences, risk behaviour differences and information 
asymmetry. It is assumed that the agent vendor has private information about the 
quality of the IS that is not available to the principal (SME). According to agent 
theory agents can therefore act in their own best interest and exposing opportunis-
tic behaviour which can lead to moral hazard (Tuttle 1997). However when prin-
cipal and agent are contracting the negotiated transaction can never be described 
perfectly. Anderlini and Felli state that: „[...] the contracting parties may lack the 
necessary degree of rationality necessary to describe exactly the various states of 
nature in the ex-ante contract they draw up‟ (Anderlini and Felli 2004).  
Unlike most theories agency theory incorporates strongly the concept of the Homo 
Economicus: a model of people as rational self-interest maximizers. Agency the-
ory inhales a deep mistrust of the principal in the agent and his actions (Ghoshal 
2005, Lubatkin 2005). It is precisely in that mistrust where the theory fails to act 
as a grand IS theory for inducing normative IT governance principles for SMEs. 
The complex balancing relationship between trust and control is elaborated by 
Reed (Reed 2001). Although this relationship can be seen as a nexus there is also 
rivalry in the theoretical underpinnings. However this rivalry must be seen as 
commingled rivalry (Yin 2003). The relation of both theories is brought together 
by Sahberwal (see Figure 1). 
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4 Research methodology and Design 
We have chosen for a qualitative and positivistic IS case study research strategy 
based on multiple cases. The choice for qualitative research is based on the acces-
sibility of well documented secondary data in litigation files of failed IS projects 
in SMEs. Eight cases of IS projects were selected. Most of the projects were sub-
ject to litigation. To avoid the difficult problem of defining a failed project, we 
used the concept of a termination error (Sauer 1993).  
OISFs are embedded in an organizational context which is not separable from the 
unit of analysis. There are definitely more variables to be studied then there is 
available data. This is a situation where the case study is an ideal research strategy 
(Yin 2003, Lee 1989). According to Yin a case study research is useful when a 
phenomenon cannot be studied outside the context in which it occurs or where the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Sauer shares 
the opinion that research to IS failures is best done by case study (Sauer 1993). 
The development of the research design and methodology is inspired by the work 
of researchers experienced in case study research (Eisenhardt 1989, Lee 1989, 
Dubé et al. 2003). 
To explain OISF and the failure of IT governance in SMEs we draw on agency 
theory and on the theory of institutional trust to induce testable propositions for 
our cases. We consider both theories as process theories (Soh et al. 1995, Markus 
1988) and as rivalry or competing theories. Both theories have discrete outcomes 
that may not occur even when conditions are present and have a logical form in 
which conditions are expressed in qualifications as necessary or sufficient rather 
than dependent and independent variables. Time is a crucial factor for both theo-
ries since conditions are building up during the course of an IT project. Both theo-
ries were studied and can be considered as falsifiable with the potential of deduc-
ing logical and consistent propositions (Lee 1989). We also craft rival propositions 
out of the theories. The theories all seem to have at least explaining power. We 
follow the same logic to induce proposition as Sarker et al. (Sarker et al. 1998).    
According to agency theory the opportunistic behaviour that eventually can occur 
is corrected with control. Kirsch views control as encompassing all attempts to en-
sure individuals in organisations act in a manner that is consistent with meeting 
organizational goals and objectives (Kirsch 1997). There are several possibilities 
to deploy control. We consider here the creation of an outcome based contract and 
the implementation of structured controls for obtaining compliance with the con-
tract. It has been shown that an outcome based contract offers the best solution in 
a setting where there is information asymmetry (Grossman et al. 1983). We come 
to the following two propositions induced from agency theory: 
P1. An OISF must happen if there are no structured controls implemented. 
Proposition P1 implies that the absence of implemented structured controls is a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for an OISF. This also implies that if there 
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are no structured controls implemented and there is no OISF, the proposition is 
falsified.  
P2. An OISF must happen if the contract is not outcome-based. 
Proposition P2 implies that the absence of an outcome-based contract is a suffi-
cient but not necessary condition for an OISF. This also implies that if there is not 
an outcome-based contract and there is no OISF, the proposition is falsified.  
P3. An OISF must happen if (there are no structured controls implemented 
and the contract is not outcome-based). 
Proposition P3 implies that an outcome-based contract together with (logically 
“and”) the absence of implemented structured controls is a sufficient but not nec-
essary condition for an OISF. This also implies that if the combined condition is 
true and there is no OISF, the proposition is falsified. Proposition P3 is much 
stronger than P1 and P1, since both condition (outcome-based contract and struc-
tured controls) must appear simultaneously.   
We induced also a proposition from institutional trust theory. The operationaliza-
tion of the construct trust is based on the work of Lander and Sabherwal who build 
a classification of trust into three types: calculus-based, knowledge-based and 
identification-based trust (Sabherwal, 1999, Lander et al. 2004) 
Calculus-based or deterrence-based trust is the lowest form of trust and exists 
when both parties can be trust to keep their word. The deterrence is rooted in the 
rewards and punishment of the project and can be found in the project contract. 
Knowledge-based trust is based on the predictability of the other party developed 
though knowing the other sufficiently well that their behaviour is predictable. The 
highest order of trust is identification-based trust and is developed when one party 
has “fully internalized the other‟s wants, and this mutual understanding is devel-
oped to the point that each can effectively act for the other” (Lander et al., 2004).  
The former authors also developed a list with trust-building mechanisms for each 
level of trust. Based on the characteristic of trust having a reciprocal nature, we 
looked for distrust evoking events and for trust-building mechanisms in the obser-
vations.   
We come to the following proposition: 
P4. An OISF must happen if there is no trust between the principal (SME 
CEO) and the agent. 
Proposition P4 implies that the absence of trust (or distrust) between both parties 
in the exchange is a sufficient but not necessary condition for an OISF.  This also 
implies that if there is trust between the principal and the agent and there is an 
OISF, the proposition is falsified. 
 
The unit of analysis in every case is the IS project in an SME environment that 
was subject to an OISF. This narrowed down our focus to a bounded system (Paré 
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2004).  Since this is a multiple-case study design we will follow replication logic 
to offer external validity. Generalisation is of major concern in every research but 
cannot be of a statistical kind in this work. The kind of generalisation that will be 
established here is an analytical generalisation (Yin 2003) or generalising from 
case study findings to theory (Lee and Baskerville 2003). The theoretical generali-
sation from the empirical description in our case study has no value beyond the 
given cases. However the generalisation from ideographic details to theory is im-
portant for offering clarification of theoretical concepts. The cases are therefore 
carefully chosen to accomplish literal replication logic (7 cases) as well as theo-
retical replication logic (1 case). In each case there is at least some evidence of in-
complete and asymmetric information, hidden actions and hidden intentions on 
behalf of the agent.  
We used a longitudinal approach in all cases. Three sources of evidence were used 
to ensure construct validity: 1) documents, 2) focus and open-ended interviews 
and 3) direct and participant observations. Project documentation, minutes from 
steering committee meetings, memorandums and letters were analyzed. Docu-
ments were delivered by three sources: plaintiff, defendant and expert witness. 
The plaintiff and defendant documents were often the same but were brought into 
litigation for opposed opinions. All expert witness reports were exposed through 
cross examination of all parties and were corrected if material errors did occur. 
This resulted in an extra triangulation of the available data. The interviews were 
recorded on audiotapes and written down in reports and sent to all parties for cross 
examination. All interviews took place in the present of all parties and the expert 
witness. The case study sites were visited at least four times for the purpose of do-
ing interviews and direct observations. Additional data was collected during those 
site visits. In three cases (Rockit, Stones and Boxcars) evidence was obtained as 
participant observer. The data coming from all sources was coded by means of a 
coding scheme, which is part of the case study protocol. The coding scheme sepa-
rates the basic data from the metadata (the documents, reports and sheets). The 
coding scheme was designed to avoid data contamination. All data is stored in a 
computerised case study database and links are made between basic data and 
metadata. The data is retrievable by computer but is also available in original and 
raw format for reviewers.  
Data was analyzed in two steps. First step was a within-case analysis to review the 
unique patterns of each case. Second a cross-case analysis was conducted in 
search for common patterns. The cases were selected to allow comparison and to 
maximise variation while respecting the ceteris paribus criteria so our multiple 
case study is analogous to multiple experiments as shown in table 1 in the appen-
dices. 
Similarities pertain to the size of the enterprises: all principal sites are family 
owned SMEs, and there is a strategic importance of the IS project. In terms of 
variation three projects are ERP implementations, three projects are software de-
velopment and implementation projects (SDI) and one project is a software devel-
opment project without implementation (SD). Case Boxcars is a consortium of 60 
car dealers who contracted together for a Dealer Information System (DIS). Cus-
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tomizing took place for all ERP projects and the DIS project in the observed cases. 
The turnover of those firm lays between €5 million and €20 million and the head-
count between 10 and 30 people. Two cases (Stones and Boxcars) were subject to 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 
Table 2 (see appendices) gives an overview of the observations in our research. 
For each case we looked at: 
- Type of contract: two types of contracts are possible: outcome-based and 
behaviour-based. In some cases a mixed type was discovered in which 
some parts of the contact were outcome-based (in particular software li-
cences) and others (in particular consultancy fees) were behaviour-based.  
- Structural controls: structural controls appropriate mechanisms including 
deliverables, reporting arrangements, meeting schedules, penalty clauses 
for governing the project. We searched for two aspects of structural con-
trols: those stipulated in the contract and those applied during the course 
of the project.   
- Information asymmetry (private information of agent and of principal): 
traces of private information at both parties.  
- Hidden actions (of principal and of agent): traces of hidden actions.   
- Lack of commitment: includes the lack of oversight and engagement by 
executives  
- Level of trust: three levels of trust are considered: deterrence-based or 
calculus-based, knowledge-based and identification-based trust. 
- Distrust evocation: f.e. broken promises, lies and personnel changes in 
the project team.   
- Trust deterioration or decline of trust: f.e. parties reacting with formal 
writings.    
- Trust building mechanisms: integrity (fulfilling promises, telling the 
truth), predictability (consistency, clear roles with responsibilities and ac-
countabilities), communications (openness, receptivity, and creating 
common language), commitment and sharing control. 
 
We summarized the major observations of structural controls (applied during the 
course of the project), trust and type of contract in table 3 (see appendices).  
5 Discussion 
Observations indicate that agency theory has certainly predicting power in show-
ing opportunistic behaviour in situations where there is information asymmetry. In 
all cases we could observe information asymmetry and in five cases this was fol-
lowed by hidden actions by the agent or the principal. However in one case 
(Mach) we could also observe hidden actions on behalf of the principal. This is a 
finding which was already suggested by Moynihan and Aubert:  
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„Agency theory views the exchange primarily from the perspective of the princi-
pal. But what of the agent‟s perspective? What strategies can agents use to protect 
themselves from potentially opportunistic or other unfavourable forms of behav-
iour on the part of the principal?‟ (Moynihan  2002) 
„Both clients and vendors tend to behave opportunistically when entering into a 
contract and this can lead to mutual disadvantage.‟ (Aubert 2003) 
Hidden actions on behalf of the agent, once revealed were always leading to an 
evocation of distrust with the principal.  
Matches of the findings with proposition P1 are cases Bupo, Hero and Dybo. 
However in case Rockit we could observe absence of structural controls and no 
OISF occurred. This leads to the conclusion that proposition P1 is falsified. OISFs 
do not always happen if there are no structured controls.   
Only case Dybo follows a pattern that matches with proposition P2. The cases 
Stones and Boxcars had no outcome based contracts but an OISF did not occur. 
Both parties went to alternative dispute resolution. In both cases the CEOs went 
sitting around the table to work on a solution to save the project and save their fu-
ture collaboration. An initially OISF which was already ripe to bring into litigation 
was removed. This leads to the conclusion that proposition P2 is falsified.  
The most compelling proposition was P3 in which only case Dybo and Rockit 
shows a match which the conditions. However in case Rockit there was no OISF, 
leading to the conclusion that also proposition P3 is falsified.  
Finally, all empirical patterns in the cases match with proposition P4. An OSIF 
must happen if there is no trust between the principal and the agent.    
There is another intriguing finding. In all cases, except case Rockit, we could ob-
serve evocation of distrust on behalf of the agent. In those cases we could observe 
that representatives of the agent made promises in the tender of the outsourced 
project that could not stand once the project was started. This is due to the lack of 
observation power of the principal ex ante. These promises often touched the es-
sentials of the projects like commitments on price, budget and quality (functional-
ity). Ex post, when the contract is signed and the endeavour with the agent takes a 
real start, the agent denies his promises which evokes very early in the project tra-
jectory mistrust with the principal that could not always be mended during the 
course of the project since there were no trust-building mechanisms. Those obser-
vations are predicted by agency theory and lead to the adverse selection by the 
principal. This is a most interesting topic which needs further investigation.     
6 Conclusions 
We can conclude that trust is more important than output-based contracts for 
eliminating opportunistic behaviour in family-owned SMEs. Even with structural 
controls in place, trust is necessary to prevent from IS failure. Trust is also more 
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important than structural controls for eliminating opportunistic behaviour in 
SMEs. The propositions deduced from agency theory are theoretical but not em-
pirical logical. The world of family-owned SMEs is significant different than this 
of large companies. Although we did not show any evidence that the same find-
ings perhaps also hold for non-SMEs. However we believe that the specific man-
agement structure in family-owned SMEs, centred round the CEO as the main de-
cision maker is a discriminating factor.  
Our findings are rather surprising for structural controls seeming less important 
than trust. However we do not conclude that structural controls are pointless in 
SME environments. This could also mean that trust and control are not necessarily 
full rivalry theories. As Reed stated: ...In short, the conventional dichotomy be-
tween normatively-based trust and politically-based control has become unsus-
tainable, as the theoretical and empirical work in organizational analysis has con-
sistently blurred the putative analytical and substantive boundaries between them 
(Reed, 2001).  
We cannot neglect the descriptive power of agency theory in an SME – OISF set-
ting, but the theory evades the issue of trust. Nooteboom comes to similar results 
in his work on trust, opportunism and governance with the transaction cost econ-
omy as underlying theory (Nooteboom 1996). Since transaction cost economy 
theory is also seen as a founding theory for IS outsourcing this may lead to sug-
gestions for further research on TCE and trust in the same SME-OISF settings.    
We argue that in an SME environment social-psychological processes with con-
structs like trust (and probably also fairness, intuition and empathy) are of more 
importance to explain the complex IT governance  phenomena and therefore are 
more appropriate for deriving guidelines for practitioners than agency theory and 
(formal) control theory. Rather the ramifications of our findings are that the 
managerial focus in SMEs is completely different compared to large companies. 
Since the SME-CEO is the crucial stakeholder of an IS project and taking into ac-
count that CEO often lacks commitment, time and knowledge this needs further 
empirical research. For researchers and practitioners this could means that it 
would be meaningful to start from the beginning with a focussed orientation to 
SMEs in their work instead of a derived vision on how things are going in large 
companies. 
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Appendices 
  
Table 1. The selected cases 
Case 
Name 
Sector Ownership 
Structure 
Turnover 
(million) 
Staff Type of 
Project 
Cost of 
Project  
Re-
sult 
(1) 
Dispute 
Resolution 
Rockit Textile Family €11.64 67 ERP  €644000 NF - 
Woody Trading Family n.a. < 200 SDI €372000 PF Litigation 
Mach Manu-
facturing 
Family €12.75 146 ERP €90000 EF Litigation 
Bupo Software  Family €0.475 8 SD €50000 PF Litigation 
Dybo Trading Family €15.65 16 SDI €50000 PF Litigation 
 Stones Manu-
facturing 
Family €31.25 200 ERP  €750000 EF ADR 
Boxcars Service Family €5.00 - 
€20.00  
10-30 DIS 60x 
€75000 
EF ADR 
Hero Service Family €4.00 5 SDI €75000 EsF Litigation 
 
(1) NF = No Failure 
EF = Expectation Failure 
EsF= Escalation Failure 
PF = Process Failure 
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Table 2. Overview and summary of case observations 
Observation Case Rockit Case Woody Case Mach Case Bupo 
IT Maturity CMM level 1 CMM level 1 CMM level 1 CMM level 1 
Type of contract Behaviour-based Outcome-based Mixed  Outcome-based 
Structural controls in con-
tract / in project 
Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/No 
Private information (agent) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Private information  (princi-
pal)  
Yes No Yes No 
Hidden actions agent No Yes Yes Yes 
Hidden actions principal No No Yes No 
Lack of commitment (agent) No Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of commitment (prin-
cipal)  
No No No No 
Level of trust Identification Deterrence  Deterrence  Deterrence  
Distrust evocation No Yes Yes Yes 
Trust deterioration No Yes Yes Yes 
Trust-building mechanisms Yes  No No No 
Observation Case Dybo Case Stones Case Boxcars Case Hero 
IT Maturity CMM level 0  CMM Level 2 CMM level 1 CMM level 0 
Type of contract Mixed Behaviour-based Mixed Outcome-based 
Structural controls in con-
tract / in project 
No/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/No 
Private information (agent) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Private information  (princi-
pal)  
No No No Yes 
Hidden actions agent No Yes Yes No 
Hidden actions principal No No No No 
Lack of commitment (agent) No No No No 
Lack of commitment (prin-
cipal)  
Yes No Yes Yes 
Level of trust Deterrence  Knowledge Deterrence  Deterrence  
Distrust evocation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trust deterioration Yes No No Yes 
Trust-building mechanisms No No No No 
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Table 3. Summary of the findings 
Trust Outcome based 
contract 
Structural con-
trols 
OISF Case 
Yes Yes Yes No - 
Yes Yes No No - 
Yes No Yes No Stones, Boxcars 
Yes No No No Rockit 
No Yes Yes Yes Foam, Woody 
No Yes No Yes Bupo, Hero 
No No Yes Yes - 
No No No Yes Dybo 
 
 
